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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
No 11-CV-1275 (JFB)(ARL)
Patrick  J. O’Connor ,
Plaintiff,
VERSUS
Huntington  U.F.S.D., Joseph  Lea v y , John Am ato ,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
March 25, 2014
Joseph F. Bianco, District Judge:
Patrick J. O’Connor (“O’Connor” or 
“plaintiff’) brings this action against his 
former employer, the Huntington Union 
Free School District (“the District”), Joseph 
Leavy (“Leavy”), and John Amato 
(“Amato”) (collectively, “defendants”) for 
retaliation in violation of his First 
Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983; and for discrimination based on his 
perceived disability pursuant to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the New 
York State Human Rights Law (“HRL”), 
N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Plaintiff alleges that 
the District constructively discharged him 
from his tenured teaching position after he 
(1) complained about cheating during the 
grading of statewide exams; and (2) 
informed supervisors that he suffered from 
anxiety and depression. Defendants move 
for summary judgment pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the 
following reasons, the Court grants the
J . O .  V j U V E K I N I V l E I ' .
IN F O R M A T IO N
motion as to the federal claims, and declines 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the remaining state claim.
I. Background 
A. Factual Background
The Court takes the following facts from 
the parties’ affidavits, depositions, exhibits, 
and Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact. The Court 
construes the facts in the light most 
favorable to O’Connor, the nonmoving 
party.1 See Capobianco v. City o f New York, 
422 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff began working for the District 
in September 1998 and received tenure in
1 Although the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements contain 
specific citations to the record, the Court cites to the 
statements rather than to the underlying citations. 
Unless otherwise noted, where a party’s Rule 56.1 
statement is cited, that fact is undisputed or the 
opposing party has not pointed to any contradictory 
evidence in the record.
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2001. (Def. 56.1 1-2.) He taught social
studies to seventh and eighth graders at 
Finley Middle School. (Id. ^ 7.) Despite 
being scheduled to teach during the 2008­
2009 academic year, O’Connor resigned on 
August 22, 2008. (Id. m  3, 8.)
1. Plaintiff’s Statements to His 
Supervisors
a. Alleged Improprieties during the
Grading of a Statewide Examination
In June 2006, plaintiff and seven other 
Finley teachers graded the statewide eighth 
grade social studies examination under the 
unofficial oversight of Mike McCabe. 
(Id. ^  90, 92.) Teachers could not grade 
their own students, and they graded the 
essays by a “round robin” whereby one 
teacher would grade an essay and then pass 
it to another. (Id. ^  93-94.) Before grading 
began, Denise Dechiaro told plaintiff that 
they would give the students only fours or 
fives (out of five) on the essays. (Id. ^ 91.) 
In fact, while Rick Erickson was grading 
one of Dechiaro’s students, Dechiaro asked 
Erickson why he was giving the student only 
a three or four. (Id. ^ 97.) Erickson told 
Dechiaro to not interrupt. (Id. ^  98-99.) 
Plaintiff also told McCabe, “You need to do 
something. You need to stop Denise from 
doing this.” (Pl. 56.1 ^ 101.) McCabe 
instructed Dechiaro “to stop interrupting 
graders while they were grading the exam 
and asking for their scores, thus violating 
exam confidentiality.” (Def. 56.1 ^ 103.)
That fall, plaintiff began to question the 
grades’ accuracy because he thought the 
scores were high for Finley given its 
demographics. (Id. ^ 104.) He believed that 
Dechiaro compromised the grading of the 
essay sections by questioning the scorers, 
although O’Connor never asked McCabe or 
Erickson if they raised any grades because
of Dechiaro’s interruptions. (Id. ^  105, 
107.) Plaintiff, however, knew of no other 
teacher who may have misgraded exams. 
(Id.^ 108.) Nevertheless, he reported what 
occurred to Amato (the Principal) and Leavy 
(the Director of Humanities), who agreed to 
investigate. (Id. ^  109-113) According to 
O’Connor, Leavy also said, “Patrick, you 
are aware that you’re going to destroy any 
relationship that you have with your 
colleagues, and that you are to prepare for 
the roller coaster ride of your career.” 
(Leavy Dep., Def. Ex. D, at 95:11-15.) 
Leavy notified Mike O’Brien, the Assistant 
Superintendent of Curriculum, of the 
allegations. (Def. 56.1 ^ 114.) After
investigating and reviewing essays and 
corresponding grades, Leavy found no 
evidence of grade inflation. (Id. ^ 116.)
b. Anxiety and Depression
Plaintiff began experiencing anxiety 
attacks in 2003 (Id. ^ 126), and his doctor, 
James Wheeler, diagnosed him with 
dysthymia in 2004 (id. ^ 127.) Plaintiff and 
his physician never gave the District notes 
regarding the condition. (Id. ^  128-29.) 
Plaintiff first told Amato and Leavy he was 
depressed and anxious in Fall 2006. (Id. 
^  130, 135.) He said his symptoms 
stemmed from mistreatment by three other 
teachers.2 (Id. ^  131, 136.) During the 
2007-2008 academic year, O’Connor told 
Amato and Leavy he was seeing a 
counselor. (Id. ^  132, 138.) Amato testified 
that plaintiff never said he suffered from 
clinical depression or anxiety. (Id. ^ 133.) 
Plaintiff never requested an accommodation 
for his condition. (See id. ^ 139.)
2 Plaintiff considers this fact immaterial because his 
relationship with his mother actually caused his 
condition. (See Pl. 56.1 ^ 131.) The District, 
however, only knew about his issues with other 
faculty members. (Def. 56.1 ^ 131.)
2
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2. Plaintiff’s Performance Reviews and 
Improvement Projects
Teachers at Finley receive Annual 
Professional Performance Reviews 
(“APPRs”). (Id. U 12.) Plaintiff’s APPRs 
from 2001 through 2005 were positive, 
although they recommended improvement in 
management of student behavior (2002 
APPR, Gould Aff. Ex. 5), student
development and assessment (2003 APPR, 
Gould Aff. Ex. 6), and preparation of 
appropriate materials and awareness of state 
educational standards (2005 APPR, Gould 
Aff. Ex. 8). The 2005 APPR was the last 
evaluation by Leavy’s predecessor, Debra 
Haskins. She encouraged plaintiff to develop 
skills for statewide assessments and 
preparing lesson materials. (Id. at 2.)
Leavy became the Director of 
Humanities on July 1, 2005. (Def. 56.1 
U 16.) He reviewed plaintiff’s file early on 
because plaintiff had a less than effective 
evaluation in previous APPRs. (Id. UU 18­
19.) In 2006, Leavy rated plaintiff as 
effective in his knowledge of the content 
area and instructional delivery, but took 
issue with plaintiff’s preparation of 
classroom materials, understanding of state 
standards, and classroom management. 
(2006 APPR, Gould Aff. Ex. 9.) Leavy 
encouraged adjustments to lesson planning 
and preparation of materials to ensure 
adherence to the statewide curriculum for 
seventh graders. (Id. at 2.) Nonetheless, he 
characterized the 2006 APPR as “generally 
effective.” (Pl. 56.1 U 26.)
John Amato became principal of Finley 
on July 1, 2006. (Def 56.1 U 28) Plaintiff’s 
2007 APPR was based on two formal 
observations and several shorter informal 
observations by Leavy and Amato. (Id. 
U 29.) Leavy observed plaintiff on March 27, 
2007. (March 2007 Observation Report,
Gould Aff. Ex. 10.) Leavy noted plaintiff’s 
command of the content and thought the 
preparation of the lesson was fair, but was 
concerned about plaintiff’ s classroom 
control, time management, and simplistic 
pedagogical practices. (Id.) Amato gave a 
more positive assessment in December 
2006. (See December 2006 Observation 
Report, Gould Aff. Ex. 11.)
The 2007 APPR was more negative than 
previous ones. Leavy and Amato took issue 
with plaintiff’ s preparation, instructional 
delivery, classroom management, and 
student assessment. (2007 APPR, Gould 
Aff. Ex. 12.) Consequently, Leavy instituted 
a Plan for Accountability and Monitoring 
(“PAM”). The PAM required plaintiff to 
submit detailed lesson plans and curriculum 
maps to ensure effective instruction in the 
classroom; provided for three unannounced 
observations per month; required submission 
of the grade book to supervisors to show a 
link between assessments and instructions; 
required plaintiff to visit colleagues’ 
classrooms; and provided for conferencing 
at any time to ensure adjustments for 
improvement. (PAM, Gould Aff. Ex. 2.) The 
PAM led to twenty-six observations of 
plaintiff during the 2007-2008 academic 
year. (Def. 56.1 U 57.) Leavy observed 
O’Connor at least seven times, and most of 
the evaluations were critical of plaintiff’s 
performance. (See 2007-2008 Leavy 
Classroom Observations, Gould Aff. Exs. 
14-17, 20, 22.) Amato formally observed 
plaintiff three times and found the lessons to 
be generally satisfactory. (See 2007-2008 
Amato Classroom Observations, Gould Aff. 
Exs. 18, 19, 21.)
Plaintiff’ s 2008 APPR also was 
negative. Leavy and Amato took issue with 
plaintiff’ s knowledge of the content area, 
preparation, instructional delivery, 
classroom management, student assessment,
3
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and reflective and responsive practice. (2008 
APPR, Gould Aff. Ex. 25.) They noted 
plaintiff’ s failure to adhere to the PAM and 
to proactively improve his performance. 
(See id. at 2-3.) Thus, Leavy proposed a 
Teacher Improvement Plan (“TIP”). The 
TIP, which never went into effect because 
plaintiff resigned, provided for, inter alia, 
weekly submission of detailed lesson plans 
to ensure effective classroom instruction and 
teaching targets; weekly professional 
periods; submission of major classroom 
assignments to ensure a link between the 
lesson and assessments; grade book reviews; 
weekly unannounced classroom 
observations; and effective classroom 
management. (TIP, Gould Aff. Ex. 3.)
3. Complaints about Leavy and 
Plaintiff’s Resignation
Plaintiff made efforts to address his 
relationship with Leavy, the deterioration of 
which plaintiff attributed to “[n]umerous 
unannounced observations, pedantic and 
punitive criticism, lack of constructive 
support, micromanagement of instruction.” 
(Def. 56.1 U 185.) For instance, plaintiff met 
with Assistant Superintendent Joseph Giani 
several times to complain about the 
treatment from Leavy. (E.g., id. U 192.) For 
instance, Plaintiff said he felt he was being 
harassed and wanted Leavy removed as his 
supervisor. (Id. UU 193-94.) Giani told 
plaintiff to follow the recommended 
program and assured him that he was not in 
danger of being fired. (Id. U 195.) Giani also 
told Leavy to be supportive of plaintiff and 
to give suggestions for improvement. (Id. 
U 197.) After additional complaints in March 
2008, Giani again told plaintiff to relax. (Id. 
UU 201, 203.) Giani said plaintiff was 
capable of meeting expectations. (Id. U 204.)
Nonetheless, after the preparation of the 
TIP and shortly before the 2008-2009
academic year, plaintiff’s psychologist 
advised plaintiff that continuing to work at 
the District would be detrimental to his 
health. (Pl. 56.1 U 3.) Dr. Wheeler 
recommended that plaintiff resign to avoid 
the stress of constant observations. (Id. UU 3, 
271.) Plaintiff tendered his resignation on 
August 22, 2008. (Def. 56.1 U 3.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed the complaint on March 
16, 2011. Defendants answered on April 15, 
2011. On May 21, 2012, defendants moved 
to amend their answer to add a res judicata 
defense and, upon such amendment, for 
summary judgment. On July 24, 2012, for 
reasons set forth orally on the record, the 
Court denied the motion to amend because 
of the prejudice to plaintiff due to the 
defendants’ delay in seeking the 
amendment, as well as on grounds of 
futility. Defendants filed the instant motion 
on July 8, 2013. Plaintiff opposed on 
September 13, 2013, and defendants replied 
on October 4, 2013. The Court held oral 
argument on October 22, 2013.
II. Standard of Review
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(a), a court may only grant a 
motion for summary judgment if “the 
movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving 
party bears the burden of showing that he or 
she is entitled to summary judgment. 
Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d 
Cir. 2005). “A party asserting that a fact 
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must 
support the assertion by: (A) citing to 
particular parts of materials in the record, 
including depositions, documents, 
electronically stored information, affidavits
4
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or declarations, stipulations (including those 
made for purposes of the motion only), 
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 
materials; or (B) showing that the materials 
cited do not establish the absence or 
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an 
adverse party cannot produce admissible 
evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(1). The court “is not to weigh the 
evidence but is instead required to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment, to draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of that 
party, and to eschew credibility 
assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town o f W. 
Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 
(2d Cir. 1996)); see Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 US. 242, 248 (1986) 
(summary judgment is unwarranted if “the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).
Once the moving party has met its 
burden, the opposing party “must do more 
than simply show that there is some 
metaphysical doubt as to the material 
facts. . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come 
forward with specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Caldarola 
v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 
2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 
(1986)). As the Supreme Court stated in 
Anderson, “[i]f the evidence is merely 
colorable, or is not significantly probative, 
summary judgment may be granted.” 477 
U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). Indeed, 
“the mere existence of some alleged factual 
dispute between the parties” alone will not 
defeat a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment. Id. at 247-48. Thus, the 
nonmoving party may not rest upon mere 
conclusory allegations or denials but must 
set forth “‘concrete particulars’” showing
that a trial is needed. R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn 
& Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 
1984) (quoting SEC v. Research Automation 
Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
Accordingly, it is insufficient for a party 
opposing summary judgment “merely to 
assert a conclusion without supplying 
supporting arguments or facts.” BellSouth 
Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 
F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d at 
33).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff alleges that the District
(1) retaliated against him for reporting the 
potential grading irregularities, in violation 
of his First Amendment rights; and
(2) discriminated against him on the basis of 
perceived disability, in violation of the ADA 
and HRL. As discussed below, the Court 
concludes that summary judgment is 
warranted in defendant’s favor on the 
federal claims because, even construing the 
facts most favorably to plaintiff, plaintiff 
cannot establish a prima facie case for either 
cause of action. In particular, as to the First 
Amendment retaliation claim, it is clear 
based upon the uncontroverted evidence in 
the record that plaintiff’s speech was as a 
public employee, rather than as a private 
citizen. In any event, no rational jury could 
conclude that plaintiff suffered a 
constructive discharge under the facts of this 
case. Finally, as to the ADA claim, there is 
no evidence in the record from which a 
rational jury could conclude that defendant 
regarded plaintiff as disabled because he 
was being treated for depression.
A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
o ’Connor brings his First Amendment 
retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, which is “a method for vindicating 
federal rights elsewhere conferred by those
5
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parts of the United States Constitution and 
federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. 
McCollan, 443 U S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). To 
succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must 
prove “(1) the challenged conduct was 
attributable at least in part to a person who 
was acting under color of state law and 
(2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a 
right guaranteed under the Constitution of 
the United States.” Snider v. Dylag, 188 
F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
To succeed on a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, a public employee first 
must establish a prima facie case by 
showing: “(1) [he] engaged in
constitutionally protected speech because 
[he] spoke as [a] citizen[] on a matter of 
public concern; (2) [he] suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (3) the speech was 
a ‘motivating factor’ in the adverse 
employment decision.” Skehan v. Vill. of 
Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 
2006), overruled on other grounds by Appel 
v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 
2008). Defendants, however, may still 
“escape liability if they can demonstrate that 
either (1) the defendant would have taken 
the same adverse action against the plaintiff 
regardless of the plaintiff’ s speech; or (2) 
the plaintiff’s expression was likely to 
disrupt the government’s activities and that 
the harm caused by the disruption outweighs 
the value of the plaintiff’s expression.” Id. 
The latter is known as the “Pickering 
balancing test” and is a question of law. See 
Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 
2004) (referring to Pickering v. Bd. o f Educ., 
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1986)). Even if the 
defendant prevails on the Pickering test, the 
plaintiff may succeed by showing that the 
adverse action was in fact motivated by 
retaliation and not by any fear of a resultant 
disruption. See Reuland v. Hynes, 460 F.3d 
409, 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
Defendants argue that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
their conduct deprived O’Connor of his First 
Amendment rights, because (1) plaintiff 
spoke as an employee and (2) the increased 
performance scrutiny does not constitute an 
adverse employment action as a matter of 
law. Plaintiff counters that he spoke as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern and 
focuses on his constructive discharge. As set 
forth below, after viewing the facts and 
drawing all inferences in the light most 
favorable to O’Connor, the Court concludes 
that plaintiff has not established a prima 
facie First Amendment retaliation claim as a 
matter of law. First, his speech is not 
protected because he spoke as a public 
employee, not as a citizen. Second, in the 
alternative, no reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that the increased performance 
scrutiny is an adverse employment action. 
Accordingly, the Court grants summary 
judgment to defendants on the First 
Amendment retaliation claim.
1. Speech as an Employee or a Citizen 
a. Legal Standard
A plaintiff alleging retaliation must 
establish speech protected by the First 
Amendment. Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 
169-70 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v. 
Town o f Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 76 (2d 
Cir. 2008)). The threshold inquiry is 
“whether the employee spoke as a citizen on 
a matter of public concern.” Id. at 170 
(quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 
418 (2006)). This test contains two separate 
requirements, both of which must be met: 
(1) the employee must speak as a citizen, 
rather than as a public employee; and (2) the 
employee must speak on a matter of public 
concern. Id. (“If the court determines that 
the plaintiff either did not speak as a citizen 
or did not speak on a matter of public
6
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concern, ‘the employee has no First 
Amendment cause of action based on his or 
her employer’s reaction to the speech.’” 
(quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418)).3 In 
discussing this inquiry, the Garcetti court 
explained that
[restricting speech that owes its 
existence to a public employee’s 
professional responsibilities does not 
infringe any liberties the employee 
might have enjoyed as a private 
citizen. It simply reflects the exercise 
of employer control over what the 
employer itself has commissioned or 
created.
547 U.S. at 421-22.
By expressly holding that speech 
pursuant to a public employee’s official 
duties is not insulated from employer 
discipline, Garcetti thus directs a court’s 
attention to the role the speaker occupied. 
Kelly v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 
No. 09-CV-2101 (JFB)(ETB), 2012 WL 
1077677, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) 
(citations omitted). Although the Supreme
3 In Sousa, the Second Circuit reiterated that “a 
speaker’s motive is not dispositive in determining 
whether his or her speech addresses a matter of 
public concern.” 578 F.3d at 173. Thus, the court 
held that “the District Court erred in concluding that 
Sousa’s speech did not address a matter of public 
concern because he was motivated by his 
employment grievances.” Id. at 174. Instead, 
“[w]hether or not speech addresses a matter of public 
concern must be determined by the content, form, 
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the 
whole record, and while motive surely may be one 
factor in making this determination, it is not, standing 
alone, dispositive or conclusive.” Id. at 175 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). As noted 
above, however, this Court need not address the 
“matter of public concern” requirement because the 
undisputed facts demonstrate as a matter of law that 
plaintiff spoke as an employee pursuant to his official 
duties, not as a citizen.
Court did not set forth specific criteria for 
determining when speech is made pursuant 
to an employee’s official duties, it instructed 
that the inquiry “is a practical one[,]” 
because “the listing of a given task in an 
employee’s written job description is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that 
conducting the task is within the scope of 
the employee’s professional duties for First 
Amendment purposes.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. 
at 424-25. The Court also noted that speech 
by a public employee retains some 
possibility of First Amendment protection 
when it “is the kind of activity engaged in 
by citizens who do not work for the 
government.” Id. at 423; see Jackler v. 
Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 238 (2d Cir. 2011).
Since Garcetti, lower courts have 
developed more guidelines for determining 
whether speech is made pursuant to a public 
employee’s official duties. Courts may 
consider the following factors, none of 
which are dispositive: the plaintiff’s job 
description; the persons to whom the speech 
was directed; and whether the speech 
resulted from special knowledge gained 
through the plaintiff’s employment. See 
Caraccilo v. Vill. o f Seneca Falls, 582 F. 
Supp. 2d 390, 405 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). As 
indicated by Garcetti, two relevant factors 
that, considered in isolation, are not 
dispositive are whether the speech occurred 
in the workplace and whether the speech 
concerned the subject matter of the 
employee’s job. See 547 U.S. at 420-21; 
accord Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 
1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2009).
b. Analysis
Defendants argue that O’Connor’s 
complaints of grading impropriety are not 
constitutionally protected because (1) the 
speech owes its existence to his professional 
duties; (2) he never conveyed his complaints
7
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to the public and only approached the New 
York State Board of Education after his 
resignation; and (3) the speech resulted from 
the special knowledge he acquired while 
acting in his professional capacity. Plaintiff 
counters that (1) the Second Circuit has not 
ruled that a teacher’s allegations of 
suspected cheating do not constitute 
protected speech; (2) the fact that he 
expressed his view at work is not 
dispositive; (3) defendants have not shown 
that reporting potential cheating was within 
the province of plaintiff’s professional 
duties; and (4) the complaints had nothing to 
do with his students, job performance, or 
working conditions, and he had no 
responsibility to oversee the grading. Given 
the underlying uncontroverted facts, the 
Court holds that, under Garcetti, plaintiff 
spoke in his capacity as a teacher, not as a 
citizen. Consequently, the First Amendment 
does not protect his speech. 4
First, O’Connor complained to his 
supervisors about the grading irregularities 
pursuant to his professional responsibilities
4 Any uncertainty as to whether this issue is a 
question of law for the Court or a mixed question of 
law and fact in part for the factfinder does not impact 
the analysis herein. The Second Circuit notes that 
“[w]hether the employee spoke solely as an employee 
and not as a citizen is also largely a question of law 
for the court.” Jackler, 658 F.3d at 237. Here, the 
issue of whether plaintiff spoke as a citizen or a 
public employee is a matter of law because no 
genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding the 
underlying content of O’Connor’s speech or the other 
factors relevant to the question of whether he spoke 
as a citizen or an employee. O’Connor argues that 
defendants have not demonstrated that reporting 
potential cheating by a colleague during the grading 
of the exams “was particularly within the province of 
plaintiff’s professional duties.” (Opp., at 10.) As set 
forth infra, the Court disagrees. Given the 
uncontroverted facts and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of plaintiff, no reasonable 
factfinder could conclude that plaintiff spoke outside 
the context of his professional duties.
and duties as a schoolteacher and grader. It 
is irrelevant that defendants point to no 
official policy requiring teachers to report 
grading irregularities or that the complaints 
did not concern his own students, 
classrooms, curricula, or safety. The Second 
Circuit is clear that “under the First 
Amendment, speech can be ‘pursuant to’ a 
public employee’s official job duties even 
though it is not required by, or included in, 
the employee’s job description.” Weintraub 
v. Bd. o f Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 
2010) [hereinafter Weintraub II]; accord 
Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 106-07 (2d 
Cir. 2011). Speech especially is “pursuant 
to” an employee’s official duties when it is 
“part-and-parcel” of the employee’s 
concerns about his ability to “properly 
execute his duties,” or when the speech is a 
“means to fulfill” and “undertaken in the 
course of performing . . . his primary 
employment responsibility.” Weintraub II, 
593 F.3d at 203; see Portelos v. City o f New 
York, No. 12-CV-3141(RRM)(VMS), 2013 
WL 789460, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2013) 
(detailing Weintraub II standard). In the 
instant case, as discussed below, it is 
uncontroverted that O’Connor spoke 
internally about suspected cheating on a 
particular statewide test that he was assigned 
to grade as part of his employment. Thus, 
even though it did not involve students that 
he taught on a regular basis, there is no 
question that reporting grading irregularities 
or any other cheating in that situation is part- 
and-parcel of his job duties as an assigned 
grader on that particular exam, as well as his 
general duties as a teacher. Ensuring the 
integrity of the taking and the grading of 
exams is a quintessential duty of a teacher. 
See, e.g., Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 
No. 08 Civ. 5996 (VM)(AJP), 2010 WL 
624020, at *24-25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010) 
(holding that teachers’ internal complaints 
about, inter alia, deplorable classroom
8
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conditions, unruly students, overcrowding, 
and schedules were unprotected because 
they concerned responsibilities that are 
“quintessentially those of a teacher”).
The situation in this case is analogous to 
Weintraub II, where a teacher complained to 
his supervisor and filed a grievance 
regarding how a student was not properly 
disciplined after throwing a book at 
Weintraub during class. 593 F.3d at 199, 
203. The Second Circuit held that Weintraub 
spoke as an employee, not as a citizen, and 
thus the speech was not protected under 
Garcetti. Id. at 203. The court reasoned that 
the grievance was “‘part-and-parcel’” of 
Weintraub’s concerns “about his ability to 
‘properly execute his duties’ as a public 
school teacher—namely, to maintain 
classroom discipline.” Id. (internal citation 
omitted). The court contrasted this with the 
situation in Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 
411 (1979), where an English teacher was 
dismissed primarily because she internally 
aired her grievances regarding the placement 
of Black people working in the cafeteria, the 
integration of the administration staff, and 
the placement of Black Neighborhood 
Youth Corps workers in semi-clerical 
positions. In Weintraub II, the Second 
Circuit noted that the grievance in Givhan 
“was not in furtherance of the execution of 
one of [the teacher’s] core duties as an 
English teacher,” but rather “concerned the 
general impression that black[] students 
might take away from the staffing of non­
teaching positions.” 593 F.3d at 203.
In this case, as in Weintraub, no 
reasonable factfinder could find that the 
complaints were not “part-and-parcel” of his 
professional duties. Id. When he graded the 
exams, O’Connor taught social studies to 
seventh graders. (Def. 56.1 ^ 7.) He graded 
the exams along with seven other Finley
teachers under the supervision of McCabe, a 
social studies teacher. (Id. ^  90, 92.) 
Plaintiff does not claim that he was not 
required to grade the exams pursuant to his 
official duties or that persons not employed 
by the District graded the exams. Further, 
plaintiff approached Leavy and Amato with 
his concerns because he thought students’ 
grades were implausible based on Finley’s 
demographics. (Id. ^ 104.) Unlike in
Givhan, there is no evidence from which a 
reasonable juror could conclude that the 
complaints concerned something akin to the 
general impressions that students or the 
public might take away from the grading 
impropriety. The only reasonable inference a 
rational factfinder could make is that 
plaintiff’ s complaints were “part-and- 
parcel” of his official duties because there 
was a de facto burden on persons who 
participated in the grading to ensure the 
integrity of the grading process and to report 
potential grading irregularities to the 
appropriate superiors.
In such circumstances, “when a public 
employee airs a complaint or grievance, or 
expresses concern about misconduct, to his 
or her immediate supervisor or pursuant to a 
clear duty to report imposed by law or 
employer policy, he or she is speaking as an 
employee and not as a citizen.” Weintraub v. 
Bd. o fE d u c, 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 219 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter Weintraub I] 
(emphasis added); see also Battle v. Bd. o f 
Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that retaliation claim failed because 
plaintiff admitted she had employment duty 
to ensure accuracy and completeness of 
student files and report mismanagement or 
fraud encountered therein); Kelly, 2012 WL 
1077677, at *13-14 (complaints regarding 
safety at school field trip, improper tutoring, 
and giving out parents’ addresses in order to 
support a Board candidate were pursuant to 
duties as a teacher); Rodriguez v. Laredo
9
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Independent Sch. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 679, 
686-87 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (finding that 
assistant superintendent’s reporting of 
testing irregularities to supervisor and board
and insistence that such practices be 
discontinued was unprotected speech, 
although it also implicated matters of public 
concern, because remarks were uttered in 
employee’s professional capacity during 
dealings with other educational 
professionals, she admitted she was 
obligated to perform duties as part of 
responsibilities for curriculum and program 
accountability, and complaints only were 
aired internally).5
Further, as in Kelly and Rodriguez, the 
second factor—the person to whom the 
speech was directed—also weighs in 
defendants’ favor. Plaintiff spoke to his 
supervisors and the District’s administration. 
(Def. 56.1 ^  109-12, 114, 120, 122.) He 
never raised his concerns publicly, and he 
only informed the State Board of Education 
of the alleged cheating in September 2008, 
after he resigned. (Id. ^ 124.) This factor 
thus supports the conclusion that O’Connor 
considered his complaints to Leavy and 
Amato to not be a public matter. See Kelly, 
2012 WL 1077677, at *13 (reasoning that 
fact that plaintiff teacher directed speech at 
school administration and supervisors, rather 
than news media or third parties, weighed in 
favor of defendants); Taylor v. N.Y.C. D ep’t
5 Taking plaintiff’s position—that the “pivotal” 
distinction “is whether the speech relates to the 
plaintiffs’ own students, classrooms, curricula, safety, 
and employment” (Opp., at 10)—to its natural 
conclusion, a teacher would not be speaking as an 
employee if she reported that another teacher’s 
students cheated or that another teacher abused her 
student. There is no support in the record for such a 
restrictive understanding of official duties. Moreover, 
at oral argument, plaintiff was unable to cite to any 
case that took such a narrow view of official duties in 
the context of a teacher, or any other analogous 
context.
o f Educ., No. 11-CV-3582, 2012 WL 
3890599, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2012) 
(noting that several courts hold that speech 
made through internal channels and without 
a relevant civilian analogue is not speech as 
a citizen and therefore is unprotected).
The third factor—whether the speech 
resulted from knowledge gained through 
plaintiff’s employment—also weighs in 
defendants’ favor. Plaintiff learned of the 
potential irregularities because he graded the 
exams, spoke to Dechiaro, saw Dechiaro 
interrupt Erikson and McCabe, and was 
aware of Finley’s demographics. Therefore, 
plaintiff only could complain about potential 
improprieties based on information obtained 
during the course of his official duties as a 
public employee. If he were not a teacher, he 
(1) would not have spoken to Dechiaro; (2) 
would not have seen Dechiaro interrupt the 
grading; and (3) would have less cause to 
believe graders changed the scores because 
of such interruptions.
In sum, although no single factor is 
dispositive, the uncontroverted facts
demonstrate that, under Garcetti, O’Connor 
spoke as a public employee, rather than as a 
private citizen, when he complained about 
potential grading improprieties. This
determination is consistent with those by 
other courts that conclude that such internal 
complaints by teachers about their
colleagues’ professional misconduct based 
upon information learned through the 
teachers’ positions constitute speech as a 
public employee that is not protected by the 
First Amendment. See, e.g., Kelly, 2012 WL 
1077677, at *12-15; Weintraub I, 409 F. 
Supp. 2d at 219; Battle, 468 F.3d at 761; 
Rodriguez, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 686-87. 
Accordingly, the Court grants summary 
judgment to defendants on the First
10
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Amendment retaliation claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.6
2. Adverse Employment Action
The Court next concludes, in the 
alternative, that defendants are entitled to 
summary judgment because, even 
construing the evidence most favorably to 
plaintiff, no rational jury could conclude that 
he was constructively discharged.
“In the context of a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, . . . only retaliatory 
conduct that would deter a similarly situated 
individual of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his or her constitutional rights 
constitutes an adverse action.” Zelnik v. 
Fashion Inst. o f Tech., 464 F.3d 217, 225 
(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). 
Adverse employment actions include 
“discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to 
promote, demotion, reduction in pay, and 
reprimand.” Wrobel v. Cnty. o f Erie, 692 
F.3d 22, 31 (2d Cir. 2012); Morris v. 
Landau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999). 
A constructive discharge is “functionally the 
same as an actual termination” and therefore 
is considered an adverse employment action. 
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 
148 (2004); see also Fitzgerald v.
Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 357 (2d. Cir. 
2001) (stating that discharge from 
employment “may be either an actual 
termination . . .  or a ‘constructive’ 
discharge”). Further, “lesser actions” may be 
“considered adverse employment actions.” 
Morris, 196 F.3d at 110; see also Phillips v.
6 Because speech as an employee is not protected, the 
Court need not determine whether the speech 
involved a matter of public concern or conduct the 
Pickering balancing analysis. See, e.g., Jackler, 658 
F.3d at 227 (“If the employee did not speak as a 
citizen, the speech is not protected by the First 
Amendment, and no Pickering balancing analysis is 
required.”).
Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Our precedent allows a combination of 
seemingly minor incidents to form the basis 
of a constitutional retaliation claim once 
they reach a critical mass.” (citing 
Bernheim, 79 F.3d at 325)).
“A constructive discharge occurs when 
an employer ‘intentionally create[s] an 
intolerable work atmosphere that force[s the 
plaintiff] to quit involuntarily.” Dall v. St. 
Catherine o f Siena Med. Ctr., — F. Supp. 2d 
---, 2013 WL 4432354, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 14, 2013) (quoting Anderson v. 
Rochester City Sch. Dist., 481 F. App’x 628, 
632 (2d Cir. 2012)). “To find that an 
employee’s resignation amounted to a 
constructive discharge, ‘the trier of fact must 
be satisfied that the . . . working conditions 
would have been so difficult or unpleasant 
that a reasonable person in the employee’s 
shoes would have felt compelled to resign.’” 
Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, 
Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 
(2d Cir. 1987)); see Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 
385 F. 3d 210, 229-30 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(requiring plaintiff to present evidence from 
which reasonable inference might be drawn 
that (1) employer’s actions were “deliberate 
and not merely negligent or ineffective,” and 
(2) a reasonable person in employee’s 
position would find working conditions 
objectively intolerable).
Plaintiff focuses on the alleged 
constructive discharge, which he alleges was 
caused by the unsatisfactory performance 
reviews from 2006-2008, and the PAM and 
TIP, which resulted in 26 obtrusive 
classroom observations during the 2007­
2008 academic year. (See Opp., at 18.) The 
question, therefore, is whether these 
working conditions—the increased 
classroom observations and performance 
scrutiny—collectively were so “objectively
11
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intolerable” that a reasonable person in 
plaintiff’ s shoes would have felt compelled 
to resign. 7 *Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 229-30.
7 Plaintiff does not argue that the scrutiny and 
negative evaluations alone constitute adverse 
employment actions, but rather emphasized in his 
opposition that he was asserting a constructive 
discharge claim. (See Pl.’s Opp. Mem. at 1 (“[T]his 
case concerns one adverse employment action 
which Defendants have glaringly failed to address 
in their papers: constructive discharge . . . .” (bold 
in original)); id. at 12 (in response to arguments that 
excessive scrutiny and negative performance reviews 
do not qualify as adverse actions for a retaliation 
claim, stating: “On this aspect of Plaintiff’s First 
Amendment claim, (as well as on this same aspect of 
his ADA and HRL claims), Defendants have, 
respectfully missed the boat. Paragraph 37 of the 
Complaint specifically pleads that plaintiff was 
constructively discharged from his tenured teaching 
position. As set forth below, this is the adverse 
employment action which is at the center of this 
case.”).) In any event, even if such an argument were 
made here, the Court would conclude, under the facts 
of this case, that the scrutiny and negative evaluations 
were not adverse actions for purposes of a retaliation 
claim. Numerous courts have held that, even under 
the liberal standard for adverse employment actions 
in the context of retaliation claims, Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006), 
excessive scrutiny and negative performance reviews 
do not constitute an adverse action unless 
accompanied by some other adverse consequence. 
See, e.g., Anand v. N.Y. State Dep’t o f Taxation o f 
Fin., No. 10-CV-5142, 2013 WL 3874425, at *9 
(E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2013) (“[C]ourts have found that 
reprimands, threats of disciplinary action and 
excessive scrutiny do not constitute adverse actions 
in a Title VII retaliation context.” (quotations and 
citations omitted)); Deshpande v. Medisys Health 
Network, No. 07-CV-375, 2010 WL 1539745, at *14 
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010) (“Likewise, the monitoring 
condition did not constitute a materially adverse 
action as defined under White [for retaliation claims].
. . . [E]ven under White’s more lenient standard, close 
monitoring, without more, is insufficient to constitute 
a materially adverse action under Title VII.” 
(citations omitted)); Ragin v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. 
Dist, No. 05 Civ. 6496 (PGG), 2010 WL 1326779, at 
*17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010) (“In the retaliation 
context, it is clear from post-White decisions in this 
Circuit that a negative or critical evaluation will not 
constitute an adverse employment action unless the
The Court determines that no reasonable 
factfinder could conclude that this is so 
under the circumstances of this particular 
case.
In articulating the high threshold for 
demonstrating a constructive discharge, the 
Second Circuit has explained:
A constructive discharge generally 
cannot be established . . . simply 
through evidence that an employee 
was dissatisfied with the nature of 
his assignments. . . . Nor is it 
sufficient that the employee feels 
that the quality of his work has been 
unfairly criticized. . . . Nor is the 
standard for constructive discharge 
merely whether the employee’s 
working conditions were difficult or 
unpleasant.
Stetson v. NYNEXServ. Co., 995 F.2d 355, 
360 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see 
also Bennett v. Watson Wyatt & Co., 136 F. 
Supp. 2d 236, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Thus, 
excessive scrutiny of job performance does 
not make out a claim for constructive 
discharge. . . . Nor does [disagreement with 
management over the quality of one’s
evaluation is accompanied by other adverse 
consequences.”); accord Workneh v. Pall Corp., 897 
F. Supp. 2d 121, 134-35 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). The
Second Circuit has made clear that the White 
standard applies in First Amendment retaliation cases 
for determining whether an adverse action has taken 
place. See Zelnik, 464 F.3d at 227 (“Our standard for 
First Amendment retaliation claims has always been 
the equivalent to the standard set forth in Burlington 
Northern”). Here, the Court similarly concludes that 
the alleged scrutiny and negative evaluations are not 
adverse actions for purposes of a retaliation claim, 
because plaintiff has not pointed to any adverse 
consequences that flowed from that conduct. Finally, 
to the extent plaintiff might claim a retaliatory hostile 
work environment, no rational jury could conclude 
that the alleged conduct reached an intolerable 
“critical mass.” Phillips, 278 F.3d at 109.
12
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performance. . . . Lastly, denials of
promotions and raises, criticism of a 
plaintiff’ s work performance, and alterations 
in, or an employee’s dissatisfaction with, 
[his] responsibilities or assignments do not 
give rise to an inference of constructive 
discharge.” (quotations and citations 
omitted)); Regis v. Metro. Jewish Geriatric 
Ctr., No. 97-CV-0906 ILG, 2000 WL 
264336, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2000) 
(“Indeed, as a matter of law, [plaintiff’s] 
complaint of receiving closer scrutiny of her 
job performance by [the supervisor] does not 
make out a claim for constructive 
discharge.”).8
Here, even construing the facts most 
favorably to plaintiff, no rational jury could 
find that plaintiff was constructively 
discharged. The Court does not discount that 
the increased scrutiny and negative 
performance reviews may have troubled 
O’Connor, and that the PAM and TIP 
required him to, inter alia, submit lesson 
plans on a regular basis and have more 
frequent classroom observations. (See, e.g.,
8 In fact, even where a constructive discharge is not 
being alleged but rather plaintiff is simply trying to 
use increased scrutiny or negative reviews to show a 
lesser adverse employment action under Title VII, 
courts have found such conduct to be insufficient to 
even constitute an adverse employment action. 
Creggett v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. o f Educ., 491 F. 
App’x 561, 568 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2012) (“[Plaintiff] 
argues that he suffered an adverse employment action 
when department chair Joe Phelps engaged in 
‘frequent and unnecessary classroom observations’ of 
[plaintiff’s] class. . . . A brief, informal classroom 
observation by one entitled to observe, that results in 
no adverse consequences or penalties, is hardly an 
adverse employment action.”); Sotomayor v. City o f 
New York, 862 F. Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (in 
case involving a claim of unfair classroom 
observations, concluding that “[c]riticism of an 
employee in the course of evaluating and correcting 
her work is not an adverse employment action. . . . 
Nor do more frequent performance evaluations 
qualify as an adverse action.”) (collecting cases).
PAM; TIP.) No reasonable factfinder, 
however, could conclude that these incidents 
led to material adverse consequences, or 
created working conditions that were so 
intolerable a reasonable person in plaintiff’s 
shoes would have felt compelled to resign. 
Although the APPRs written by Leavy were 
more negative than previous ones, and the 
PAM and TIP required plaintiff to submit 
lesson plans in advance and provided for 
extensive classroom observations and other 
remedial measures, plaintiff proffers no 
evidence that his classes, hours, or 
responsibilities were materially restricted (if 
at all). He does not claim he was threatened 
with pay reduction, demotion, or termination 
if his performance did not improve. Giani 
even assured plaintiff that he was not in 
danger of termination. (E.g., Def. 56.1 
^ 195.) Further, plaintiff does not dispute 
that he was given opportunities to address 
the concerns raised by the observations (id. 
^ 31); offered a transfer to the high school in 
2007, which he declined (id. ^  37-38); that 
evaluations by Amato were constructive (id. 
^ 82); and that Leavy gave positive 
evaluations as well (id. ^ 221).
In short, plaintiff fails to show a genuine 
dispute as to whether the increased scrutiny 
and negative reviews, viewed collectively, 
created “working conditions [that were] so 
difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable 
person in [plaintiff’s] shoes would have felt 
compelled to resign.’”9 Whidbee, 223 F.3d
9 Although plaintiff attempts to rely on the 
administrative law judge’s finding that plaintiff had 
good cause to resign, that finding is not dispositive 
on the constructive discharge claim in this case and, 
in any event, carries little weight because of the 
differing standard under which it was decided. First, 
the ALJ did not apply a “reasonable person” standard 
to determine whether the working conditions were 
objectively intolerable. (See Decision, Gould Aff. Ex. 
1, at 3 (focusing on depression and stating that “good 
cause to quit cannot always be viewed from the 
perspective of the average reasonable man, but rather
13
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at 73. Accordingly, in the alternative, the 
Court grants summary judgment to 
defendants on the First Amendment 
retaliation claim on this ground.10
3. Monell Liability
Because Leavy and Amato did not 
violate plaintiff’ s First Amendment rights as 
a matter of law, the District cannot be 
municipally liable based on any policy, 
practice, or custom, or the involvement of 
supervisory officials. See Monell v. Dep’t o f 
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) 
(“Congress did not intend municipalities to 
be held liable unless action pursuant to 
official municipal policy of some nature 
caused a constitutional tort.”); see also 
Pooler v. Hempstead Police D ep’t, 897 F. 
Supp. 2d 12, 20-21 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting 
that Monell requires some constitutional 
violation). Accordingly, because there is no 
underlying tort, the Court grants summary 
judgment to the District on the First 
Amendment retaliation claim.11
B. ADA Discrimination Claim
the perspective of the each [sic] individual claimant 
must be taken into account”). Second, the ALJ took 
into account plaintiff’s anxiety and depression in 
finding that he could not handle the increased 
observations, but did not conclude that the defendants 
deliberately created an intolerable working 
environment in retaliation for his speech.
10 Defendants also argue: (1) there is no causal 
relationship between plaintiff’s speech and any 
subsequent adverse employment action; and (2) 
Leavy and Amato are entitled to qualified immunity. 
Because the Court has ruled that plaintiff’s speech 
was not constitutionally protected and (in the 
alternative) plaintiff did not suffer an adverse 
employment action for purposes of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim, the Court need not 
address these issues.
11 The Court, therefore, need not and does not address
whether there was any official policy or custom, the
effect of Leavy’s and Amato’s supervisory roles, or 
the cat’s paw theory of liability.
Defendants move for summary judgment 
on plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim, 
arguing that he cannot show (1) he was 
perceived as suffering from a disability that 
substantially limited a major life activity; (2) 
he suffered an adverse employment action; 
and (3) the District lacked non­
discriminatory, non-pretextual reasons for 
the employment actions. Plaintiff, who now 
only argues that Leavy and Amato 
“regarded” him as having an ADA disability 
that rendered him unable to work12 (Opp., at 
1, 21, 23), counters that a reasonable jury 
could find in his favor because (1) he was 
being treated for dysthymia and anxiety 
from 2003 through his alleged constructive 
discharge in 2008 and (2) the heightened 
scrutiny began only after he told Leavy and 
Amato that he suffered from anxiety and 
depression (id. at 21-23). As set forth 
below, after viewing the facts and drawing 
all inferences in the light most favorable to 
O’Connor, the Court concludes that he has 
not established a prima facie ADA disability 
discrimination claim as a matter of law. 
First, there is simply no evidence from 
which a rational jury could find that 
plaintiff’s supervisors regarded him as 
having an ADA disability. Second, in the 
alternative, no reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that the increased performance 
scrutiny is an adverse employment action. 
Accordingly, the Court grants summary 
judgment to defendants on the ADA 
disability discrimination claim.
1. “Regarded As” Having a Disability
The ADA prohibits discrimination 
against a “qualified individual on the basis 
of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).13 To
12 Plaintiff disclaims any hostile work environment or 
ADA retaliation claim. (Opp., at 1-2.)
13 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) 
became effective on January 1, 2009, and expanded 
the class of individuals entitled to protection under
14
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succeed on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must 
prove “(1) the defendant is covered by the 
ADA; (2) plaintiff suffers from or is 
regarded as suffering from a disability 
within the meaning of the ADA; (3) plaintiff 
was qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the job, with or without 
reasonable accommodation; and (4) plaintiff 
suffered an adverse employment action 
because of his disability or perceived 
disability.” Kinneary v. City o f New York, 
601 F.3d 151, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Capobianco, 422 F.3d at 56).
Here, plaintiff must show he was 
“regarded as having” a “disability” within 
the meaning of the ADA: “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A), 
(C).14 “[T]he decisive issue is the 
employer’s perception of his or her 
employee’s alleged impairment.” Giordano 
v. City o f New York, 274 F.3d 740, 748 (2d 
Cir. 2001). A plaintiff “is regarded as having 
an impairment” if he:
(1) has a physical or mental 
impairment that does not 
substantially limit major life 
activities but is treated by an 
employer as constituting such 
a limitation; (2) has a 
physical or mental 
impairment that substantially 
limits major life activities
the ADA. This Court has indicated—and the parties 
agree—that the ADAAA does not apply to conduct 
that occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. 
See, e.g., Casseus v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 
2d 326, 345 n. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing cases). 
Thus, the Court evaluates the evidence within the 
legal framework in place at the time of plaintiff’s 
resignation in 2008 and not under the ADAA.
14 Under the ADAAA, “disability” is now defined at 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
only as a result of the attitude 
of an employer toward such 
impairment; (3) or has none 
of the impairments defined in 
(b) of this section but is 
treated by an employer as 
having such an impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(e); see McCowan v. 
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 689 F. Supp. 2d 
390, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
Depression may qualify as a disability 
for purposes of the ADA, “provided that the 
condition is not a ‘temporary psychological 
impairment,’” Reilly v. Revlon, Inc., 620 F. 
Supp. 2d 524, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting 
Oblas v. Am. Home Assur. Co., No. 98­
9350, 1999 WL 759026, at *2 (2d Cir. 
1999)), and it substantially limits a major 
life activity, see Mabry v. Neighborhood 
Defender Serv., 769 F. Supp. 2d 381, 399­
400 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). An impairment
“substantially limits” the major life activity 
of working if an individual is “significantly 
restricted in the ability to perform either a 
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in 
various classes as compared to the average 
person having comparable training, skills 
and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). 
“The inability to perform a single, particular 
job does not constitute a substantial 
limitation in the major life activity of 
working.” Id. The plaintiff “bears the burden 
of demonstrating that her employer 
‘perceived her to be incapable of working in 
a broad range of jobs’ suitable for one of 
similar age, experience, and training.” 
Johnson v. City o f New York, 326 F. Supp. 
2d 364, 369-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting 
Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 
872 (2d Cir. 1998)).
It is undisputed that Dr. Wheeler 
diagnosed plaintiff with dysthymia and 
anxiety in 2003, and O’Connor was being
15
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treated for those issues when he resigned in 
August 2008. (Pl. 56.1 3, 266-67.) Leavy
and Amato learned that plaintiff was 
depressed and anxious in 2006, and that he 
was seeing a counselor in 2007. (Def. 56.1 
ffl[ 130, 132, 135, 138.) However, the 
Second Circuit has made clear that 
knowledge of an impairment by an employer 
is, by itself, insufficient to show that an 
employer regarded an employee as a 
“qualified individual with a disability” under 
the ADA. For example, in Reeves v. Johnson 
Controls World Services, Inc, 140 F.3d 144 
(2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit 
explained:
Defendants do not dispute that 
Johnson Controls knew of plaintiff’s 
diagnosed mental impairment before 
he was dismissed. However, the 
mere fact that an employer is aware 
of an employee’s impairment is 
insufficient to demonstrate either that 
the employer regarded the employee 
as disabled or that that perception 
caused the adverse employment 
action. . . . Plaintiff must show that 
defendants perceived his impairment 
as substantially limiting in the 
exercise of a major life activity. 
Plaintiff does not specify which 
major life activity defendants 
allegedly perceived as substantially 
limited by his mental impairment.
We reject the possibility that 
defendants perceived plaintiff as 
substantially limited in his ability to 
engage in “everyday mobility” not 
only because we conclude that, as 
defined by plaintiff in this case, 
“everyday mobility” is not a major 
life activity, . . . but because plaintiff 
presents no evidence tending to show 
that defendants perceived it as such.
Id. at 153; see also Taylor v. Rite Aid Corp., 
Civil No. WDQ-12-2858, 2014 WL 320214, 
at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2014) (employer’s 
“‘awareness’ that [plaintiff] had lupus and 
took intermittent FMLA leave, and that 
those conditions affected some aspects of 
her work, is insufficient to show [plaintiff] 
was regarded as disabled); Green v. Pace 
Suburban Bus, No. 02 C 3031, 2004 WL 
1574246, at *8 (N.D. 1ll. July 12, 2004) 
(“[T]o the extent that Plaintiff can show that 
the decisionmakers had at least potential 
exposure to the specifics of the medical 
diagnoses . . . Plaintiff identifies no evidence 
whatsoever that this exposure to any medical 
terms led to decisionmakers to come to any 
assessments concerning whether Plaintiff 
was disabled as to any of the major life 
activities that Plaintiff proposes. Precedent 
teaches that even if [the defendant] was 
aware of [plaintiff’s] IDC [i.e., heart 
condition] or any related condition such as 
dyspnea, mere awareness of a potential 
medical condition does not, standing alone, 
support an inference that [the defendant] 
regarded [plaintiff] as substantially limited 
in any of his proposed major life activities.”) 
(citations omitted); accord Helfrich v. 
Lehigh Valley Hosp., No. Civ. A. 03-CV- 
05793, 2005 WL 670299, at *18 (ED. Pa. 
Mar. 18, 2005).
Here, plaintiff points to no evidence, 
beyond the supervisor’s mere awareness of 
his treatment for depression, that they 
regarded him as disabled. In fact, the 
uncontroverted evidence in the record belies 
any conclusion or reasonable inference that 
defendants perceived him as disabled. First, 
plaintiff never provided the District with any 
doctor’s recommendations. (Def. 56.1
^  128-29.) Second, neither Leavy nor 
Amato knew plaintiff’s depression was 
clinical or required any accommodations. 
(See, e.g., Def. 56.1 133-35, 139.) They
thought his depression was due to conflicts
16
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in the workplace. (E .g id . ^ 136.) Third, no 
APPR or other written document references 
anxiety and depression. (See, e.g., 2002­
2008 APPRs, Gould Aff. Exs. 6-10, 12, 26.) 
Fourth, even when he increased his scrutiny 
of plaintiff, Leavy never restricted plaintiff’s 
hours and teaching time, reached any 
conclusions regarding plaintiff’s 
performance because of any perceived 
disability, or made any remarks suggesting 
that plaintiff could not perform his 
professional duties because of depression 
and anxiety. Finally, the fact that plaintiff 
was scheduled to teach from 2008-2009 also 
belies any conclusion that defendants 
perceived him to be unable to work as a 
teacher or any “broad range of jobs,” 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). See, e.g., Taylor, 2014 
WL 320214, at *8 (by offering a different 
position, employer “specifically
demonstrated its perception that Plaintiff 
could continue to work” and thus did not 
regard [plaintiff] as disabled (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)).
By way of contrast, in McGowan, this 
Court found that the plaintiff had set forth 
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue 
of fact regarding whether the defendant 
regarded the plaintiff as disabled, because 
there was evidence that (1) the supervisor 
made remarks in front of plaintiff about 
depression and depressed individuals; (2) 
the supervisor restricted the plaintiff to 
entry-level tasks and made statements 
regarding her inability to resume her role at 
work after returning from disability leave; 
and (3) the supervisor regarded the plaintiff 
as unable to perform her job. 689 F. Supp. 
2d at 403. Here, other than plaintiff’s 
subjective perceptions, there is no evidence 
from which a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that Leavy and Amato considered 
plaintiff to be substantially limited in a 
major life activity.
Courts have reached a similar conclusion 
under analogous circumstances. For
example, in Adams v. Festival Fun Park, 
LLG, Civil Action No. 3:11-cv-427 (JCH), 
2013 WL 951710, at *6-7 (D. Conn. March 
12, 2013), the court granted summary 
judgment for an employer on a “regarded 
as” claim and concluded that, although 
supervisors were aware of mental
impairment, no rational jury could find he 
was “regarded as” disabled:
Adams has not provided evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could 
find that Festival Fun Parks regarded 
him as disabled within the meaning 
of the ADA. Adams did not testify 
that he told his supervisors that he 
had taken special education classes 
and that he had a “hard time with 
remembering a lot of things. . . .” 
However, even viewing this 
evidence in a light most favorable to 
Adams, it does not show that his 
supervisors’ awareness of his 
comments resulted in their 
perceiving him as being disabled, 
much less substantially limited in his 
exercise of a major life activity. 
Adams did not show them any 
medical reports assessing him as 
mentally disabled, and there is no 
evidence that his soon-to-be 
supervisors responded to Adams’ 
comments in a way that evinced that 
they perceived him to be disabled. In 
fact, after this conversation occurred, 
Festival Fun Parks hired him as a 
full-time employee, and nothing in 
the record shows any reservations 
related to this decision.
Id. at *6 (citation omitted); see also Ogborn 
v. United Food & Gommercial Workers 
Union, Local No. 881, 305 F.3d 763, 768 
(7th Cir. 2002) (granting summary judgment
17
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for union employer and concluding that, 
although plaintiff asserted that he was 
“regarded as” disabled due to his depression, 
plaintiff “has not presented evidence that 
union personnel held exaggerated views 
about the seriousness of his illness”); 
Zuppardo v. Suffolk Cnty. Vanderbilt 
Museum, 19 F. Supp. 2d 52, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 
1998) (“[E]ven assuming that the plaintiff 
was able to establish that the Museum 
viewed Zuppardo as suffering from a mental 
impairment, there has been no suggestion 
that the Museum perceived such impairment 
as interfering with his ability to perform his 
essential job functions.”).
Accordingly, the Court grants summary 
judgment to defendants on the ADA 
discrimination claim on this ground.
2. Adverse Employment Action
The Court further concludes, in the 
alternative, that summary judgment is 
warranted because plaintiff cannot show an 
adverse employment action because of his 
disability. An adverse employment action is 
a “materially adverse change” in the terms 
and conditions of employment. Sanders, 361 
F.3d at 755 (citing Richardson v. N.Y.S. 
Dep’t o f Corr. Serv., 108 F.3d 426, 446 (2d 
Cir. 1999)). As extensively detailed supra, 
plaintiff fails to establish that he suffered a 
constructive discharge. Accordingly, the 
Court grants summary judgment to 
defendants on the ADA discrimination claim 
on this ground as well.15
C. HRL Discrimination Claim
15 The Court, therefore, does not address whether 
plaintiff otherwise was qualified to perform the 
functions of his job or whether defendants had 
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the 
additional performance scrutiny.
Plaintiff’s complaint also asserts a cause 
of action under New York law.
Having determined that the federal 
claims against the County do not survive 
summary judgment, the Court concludes that 
retaining jurisdiction over any state law 
claims is unwarranted. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers o f Am. 
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). “In the 
interest of comity, the Second Circuit 
instructs that ‘absent exceptional
circumstances,’ where federal claims can be 
disposed of pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or 
summary judgment grounds, courts should 
‘abstain from exercising pendent
jurisdiction.’” Birch v. Pioneer Credit 
Recovery, Inc., No. 06-CV-6497T, 2007 WL 
1703914, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 8, 2007) 
(quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 
784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1986)).
Therefore, in the instant case, the Court, 
in its discretion, “‘decline[s] to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction’” over plaintiff’s 
state law claim because “it ‘has dismissed 
all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction.’” Kolari v. New York- 
Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)); 
see also Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free 
Sch. Dist, 514 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“We have already found that the district 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
appellants’ federal claims. It would thus be 
clearly inappropriate for the district court to 
retain jurisdiction over the state law claims 
when there is no basis for supplemental 
jurisdiction.”); Karmel v. Liz Claiborne, 
Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3608, 2002 WL 1561126, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002) (“Where a 
court is reluctant to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction because of one of the reasons 
put forth by § 1367(c), or when the interests 
of judicial economy, convenience, comity 
and fairness to litigants are not violated by
18
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refusing to entertain matters of state law, it 
should decline supplemental jurisdiction and 
allow the plaintiff to decide whether or not 
to pursue the matter in state court.”).
Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to retain 
jurisdiction over the remaining state law 
claim given the absence of any federal 
claims that survive summary judgment.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court 
grants defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment in its entirety with respect to the 
federal claims. The Court declines to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
state law claim and, thus, dismisses such 
claim without prejudice. The Clerk of the 
Court shall enter judgment accordingly and 
close this case.
SO ORDERED.
JOSEPH F. BIANCO 
United States District Judge
Dated: March 25, 2014 
Central Islip, NY
* * *
Plaintiff is represented by Jane Bilus 
Gould of Gould & Berg, LLP, 222 
Bloomingdale Road, Suite 304, White 
Plains, NY 10605-1513. Defendants are 
represented by Jeltje DeJong, Anne C. 
Leahey, Joshua Shteierman, and Kelley E. 
Wright of Devitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, 50 
Route 111, Smithtown, NY 11787.
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